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The article analyses key points of conflict in the constitutional process of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. The author identifies the issue of internal 
territorial delimitation as the hot spot in the dispute between the most influential 
political parties, and argues the source of conflict was the fact that different politi-
cal strategies were attached to the national ideologies which had been formed long 
before the creation of the state in 1918. Although not entirely unified regarding all 
constitutional issues, a key Slovenian and a key Croatian political party advocated 
the preservation of historical boundaries, in line with the federalization strategy 
based on the national principle. Through various political and legal maneuvers 
their alternative proposals were completely ignored, with the Vidovdan constitution 
establishing the unitary regime. 
Key words: constitution, state organization, political strategy, local government, 
national question
1. INTRODUCTION – THE BACKGROUND OF DIVISIONS
The South Slavs in the pre-Yugoslav period experienced several different 
state formations; from principalities under the supremacy of more powerful 
kingdoms through to completely independent states. At the beginning of the 
20th century, Serbs already had a unitary state under the rule of a Serbian king, 
while Slovenians and Croats lived within the lands of the Habsburg Monarchy. 
Although there existed numerous political visions, the majority of Serbian Yu-
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goslav concepts were based on the idea of  a state that would unite all Serbs and 
have at least a relative Serbian majority. According to this vision, the South Slav 
state should be centralized and unitary, while its legal tradition should be based 
on continuity of the independent Serbian state. On the other side, the Croats 
had developed wider range of state concepts; from a completely independent 
Croatia to federal and confederal ideas whether inside or outside of the Habsburg 
Monarchy.1 Common to all of them was the reunion of Croatia, Slavonia and 
Dalmatia within a ‘triune’ kingdom. The Slovenians, however, regardless of their 
political preference, foremost strived to include the whole Slovenian ethnic area 
in the South Slavs formation, while the dominant conservative party Slovenska 
ljudska stranka (the Slovenian People’s Party, SLS) considered, at least during 
the Habsburg Monarchy era2, that Roman Catholics should have the dominant 
position and the role of cultural mentors for the other South Slavs. 
During the period of World War 1 the predominant part of Slovenians 
and Croats laid high hopes on the Habsburg Monarchy being preserved and 
the creation of a third (South Slav) unit. In contrast, the political leadership 
of Serbia saw the Habsburgs as the biggest obstacle on the way to a common 
South Slav state. All of these different visions of the future were reflected in 
the legal and political acts of that period. Although, some consider the May 
Declaration as revolutionary new concept3, its main elements emphasized the 
Habsburg Monarchy framework and Croatia’s historical state right, while the 
Serb opposition saw the Serbian royal dynasty Karađorđević as the fundament 
of the future South Slav state.4 An example of formal Serbian political view 
was presented on 18 October 1918, when the Manchester Guardian reported 
on Nikola Pašić’s statement that the South Slavs would create a great Serbian 
state, which would be the framework for integrating the ‘unfortunate fate’ that 
had divided it in the past. At the same, Serbian military commanders in the 
field were not hiding the fact they were prepared to go to war for the ideal of 
Greater Serbia.5
1 Engelsfeld, N., Hrvatske federalističke ideje u razdoblju između dva rata 1918-1941, Zbor-
nik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, vol. 50, no. 6, 2000, pp. 937 – 955.
2 Rahten, A., Slovenska ljudska stranka v dunajskem parlamentu: slovenska parlamentarna 
izkušnja v habsburški monarhiji 1897-1914, Cenesa, Celje, 2001.
3 Lukan, W., Habsburška monarhija in Slovenci v prvi svetovni vojni, Zgodovinski časopis, 
vol. 62, no. 1-2, 2008, pp. 91 – 149.
4 Rahten, A., Slovenska ljudska stranka v beograjski skupščini. Jugoslovanski klub v parlamen-
tarnem življenju Kraljevine SHS 1919-1929, Založba ZRC, Ljubljana, 2002, p. 13.
5 Đokić, D., Nedostižni kompromis. Srpsko-hrvatsko pitanje u međuratnoj Jugoslaviji, Fabrika 
knjiga, Beograd, 2010, p. 39.
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When the Austro-Hungarian Empire fell apart, the Slovenians and Croats 
rushed to form the State of Slovenians, Croats and Serbs (State of SCS). Although 
the latter fulfilled all key criteria of statehood which were later formalized in the 
Montevideo Convention (permanent population, territory, effective authority 
and the capacity to create relationships with other subjects of international 
law)6, it soon ceased to exist upon the First-December Act which formed the 
Kingdom of SCS. The clash of opposing political strategies, this time within the 
common state, put to the test Ivan Cankar’s (a Slovene writer, poet and political 
activist) famous claim that the southern Slavs will not become the same nation 
due to the overly long period of divergence in cultural development, but could 
achieve political unity if they accept the concept of political Yugoslavism.7 The 
earliest disputes already occurred over the legal nature of the First-December 
Act, as well as the legal continuity of the Kingdom of SCS.8 While the Serbian 
authorities were celebrating the Kingdom of SCS’ formation9, some Croats were 
protesting because the First-December Act was never ratified in parliaments10, 
and, thus, denied the legitimacy and legality of this Act. The fact the Serbian 
army behaved like an occupying force11 only increased mistrust in and aversion 
to the Serbian authorities among the non-Serb population, resulting in several 
revolts including Croatian military troops’ protest against Croatian merging 
with Serbia on 5 December 1918, to which the new government responded 
with force killing 13 and wounding 17 demonstrators.12 In this context, it was 
crucial to form the constitution to calm the electrified atmosphere down and 
provide an environment for the coexistence of the various South Slav statehood 
traditions, which seemed incompatible. 
6 Crawford, J., The creation of states in international law, Clarendon, Oxford, 2007, pp. 
111 – 119.
7 Melik, V., Slovenci 1848–1918: razprave in članki, Litera, Maribor, 2002, p. 605.
8 Ivašković, I., Der Streit um den Rechtsstatus des Königreiches der Serben, Kroaten und 
Slowenen, in: Holcman, B. (ed.), Festschrift für Gernot Kocher zum 75. Geburtstag „--- ich 
rief dich bei deinem Namen und gab dir Ehrennamen“ (Jes 45, 4), Faculty of Law, Maribor, 
2017, pp. 197 – 221.
9 Jovanović, S., Ustavno pravo Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, Izdavačka knjižarnica 
Geze Kona, Beograd, 1924, p. 9.
10 Vukas, B., Hrvatska državnost s gledišta međunarodnog prava, Pravni fakultet, Zagreb, 
2002, p. 47.
11 Banac, I., Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji: porijeklo, povijest, politika, Globus, Zagreb, 
1988, pp. 144 – 146.
12 Pavličević, P., Povijest Hrvatske, Naklada Pavičić, Zagreb, 2002, p. 320.
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The post-World War 1 state of South Slavs and its first constitution has been 
quite well researched and described in literature from various aspects. This study 
brings a fresh perspective on crucial processes of adopting the first constitution 
of the Kingdom of SCS, presents its alternatives and opponents, emphasizes key 
conflicting issues that were posed in the constitutional parliamentary debate, 
and evaluates it from Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian national perspective. 
Therefore, this article has the ambition to enrich the literature with new per-
spective on existing theses on South Slavs relations between two world wars. 
2. POLITICAL SCENE OF THE KINGDOM OF SCS
The formation of the Kingdom of SCS brought different political traditions 
together. During the late 19th and early 20th century lively political activity 
developed within Serbia where three political streams (liberal, radical-nation-
al and conservative) were forcing each other to improve their political pro-
grammes13, but due to constant political upheavals accompanied by political 
murders the independent Serbia failed to develop modern state institutions. 
Hostility between two Serbian royal families, slower economic development, 
the constant danger of military conflicts and, finally, the War shaped a kind of 
political culture in Serbia whereby the most important factor was the control 
over repressive authorities. On the other hand, it would be unfair to say that 
Slovenians and Croats were from the political aspect in more stable environ-
ment, but rather that their political representatives had to take into account 
much stronger political forces within the Habsburg Monarchy, so the Slove-
nians and Croats had to primarily rely on parliamentary activity. Those dif-
ferences in political culture spilled over and consequently shaped the following 
parliamentary discussion of the new state.14  
One Serbian political party that ignored cultural differences or at least 
downplayed them was the Demokratska stranka (Democratic Party, DS). It 
saw the particular South Slav state as an ideal opportunity for implementing 
the concept of an indivisible Yugoslav nation. However, the historical develop-
ment of particular concept shows that this political group grounded its pro-
13 Perović, L., Narodna radikalna stranka: utemeljenje ideologije socijalnog, nacionalnog I po-
litičkog jedinstva srpskog naroda, in: Biserko, S. (ed.), Proces Vojislavu Šešelju: Raskrinka-
vanje projekta Velika Srbija, Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Beograd, 2009, 
pp. 35 – 90.
14 Gašparič, J., Parlamentarna razprava v prvi Jugoslaviji, Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino, 
vol. 54, no. 2, 2014, pp. 63 – 78.
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gram more in Serbian national ideology than in pan-Slavism. Indeed, Ljubom-
ir Davidović as party’s formal president, and even more the party’s ideologist 
Svetozar Pribićević, advocated specific Yugoslav nation. Pribićević’s previous 
political activity clearly showed him advocating the union of South Slavs with 
two preconditions; 1) exclusion of Bulgarians and 2) the Serbian leadership of 
the union.15 One of the key objectives in this political strategy was to imple-
ment a strong central state administration, implying the rejection of any form 
of federalism. Therefore, in the constitutional assembly election campaign the 
DS sought to convince voters of the harmfulness of preserving the historical 
borders within the state. For the DS, the latter would only benefit separat-
ist groups financially supported by foreign forces (mainly Italy, Germany and 
Hungary), that wanted to retain the internal potential for the Yugoslav unity’s 
destruction. In line with DS’s programme, the concept of Yugoslav nation re-
quested unified state administration, and thus the party considered it legiti-
mate to strive to break off the legal traditions of the states that had existed 
prior to the Kingdom of SCS.16 Of course, the political movement within DS 
was a complex of various views on desired future of South Slavs; even Svetozar 
Pribićević himself has been changing his perspective dramatically during the 
first decade of the Kingdom SCS17, so it would be pretentious to oversimplify 
the politics of particular party. However, the DS advocated the state central-
ization until it directly affected the party itself.18
The political party with the by far largest support in Serbia (foremost in 
Serbian rural areas19), the Narodna radikalna stranka (National Radical Par-
ty, NRS), was committed to the idea of unitarism, but it did not agree with 
omitting the “historical right to a state” concept from the fundaments of the 
Kingdom of SCS. In this context, however the party leaders considered that 
the Croatian historical right had failed to pass “the historical test”, so the 
Kingdom of SCS should only be based on the tradition of the Serbian state. 
General opinion within the NRS was also that there was no need to create a 
hybrid Yugoslav nation because the Croats and Slovenians should over time 
adopt the key elements of Serbian culture. Consequently, the NRS’s political 
15 Ivašković, I., Razsežnosti jugoslovanstva v prvi polovici 20. stoletja, Faculty of Social 
Sciences, Ljubljana, 2012, pp. 151 and 171 – 176.
16 Banac, op. cit. (fn. 11), p. 175.
17 Matković, H., Svetozar Pribičević i Samostalna demokratska stranka do šestojanuarske dik-
tature, Institut za hrvatsku povijest, Zagreb, 1972.
18 Dobrivojević, I., Državna represija u doba diktature kralja Aleksandra 1929-1935, Insti-
tut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2006.
19 Perović, op. cit. (fn. 13), p. 45.
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strategy included the idea of  a strong central state administration, but did 
not completely exclude the existence of certain federal elements. The latter 
should however imply the need to change historical borders, which actually 
meant a reduction of the Croatian unit according to the linguistic theory of 
Teodor Pavlović and Vuk Karadžić and their postulate that Croats live only in 
the area of the Chakavian dialect. The NRS programme promoted the idea of 
political centralization and administrative decentralization, which would en-
able the concentration of political power in Belgrade, while administrative au-
tonomy would be given to Serbian enclaves in predominantly Croatian areas. 
Consistently with that, the NRS proposal for internal territorial delimitation 
envisaged the cancellation of the historical borders, which would contribute 
to the creation of a Serb majority in the Dalmatian hinterland. Party member 
Stojan Protić also suggested combining Herzegovina and Montenegro, which 
would put the Croats in western Herzegovina in a minority position. Similar 
motifs also lay behind the proposal to combine areas of Bačka and Syrmia in 
Vojvodina.20 Despite their programmatic differences, NRS and DS both advo-
cated a similar internal state organization and were therefore highly probable 
coalition partners after the constitutional elections. In addition, the fact that 
both parties had different electoral bases (the NRS enjoyed support in Serbia, 
while the DS targeted Serbian voters outside Serbia) helped prevent any kind 
of competition between the parties in the pre-election campaign. 
The political scene in Croatian areas was more fragmented, due to various 
factors (a large percentage of Serbs in Dalmatian hinterland and in some parts 
of Slavonia and Syrmia; different political traditions in Dalmatia and Croa-
tia-Slavonia etc.). However, especially in Croatia-Slavonia area by far the most 
popular was Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka (the Croatian Peoples’ Peasant 
Party, HPSS)21, which programme was based on national self-determination, 
autonomy and republicanism. Combining the concept of the historical Croa-
tian state right with the peasant heritage enabled broad support for the party 
not only among farmers, but also among part of the Croatian bourgeoisie. 
When it became clear the Habsburg state would not survive, the HPSS presi-
dent, Stjepan Radić, proposed the creation of the Danubian Federation which 
for a certain period would be under a French or American protectorate. Then, 
when it became obvious that the Habsburg South Slavs would merge with the 
Kingdom of Serbia, Radić suggested a three-member presidency consisting of 
the Serbian king, the Croatian Ban and the President of the Slovenian Na-
20 Ibid., pp. 162 – 163.
21 Avramovski, Ž., Britanci o kraljevini Jugoslaviji: Godišnji izvještaji Britanskog poslanstva u 
Beogradu 1921–1930, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 1986, p. 38.
Zbornik PFZ, 68, (3-4) 525-551 (2018) 531
tional Council. According to this plan, the constitutional assembly should be 
composed of 42 members: 10 from the Serbian assembly, 10 from the Croatian 
parliament and 10 from the Slovenian National Council, while Bosnia would 
have the right to select four members, and Montenegro, Dalmatia, Vojvodi-
na and Istria would each have two members.22 After forming the Kingdom 
of SCS, Radić suggested introducing the American federal model. The latter 
represented an ideal, not only due to the use of federal principles, but also 
because at that time US diplomacy emphasized the importance of national 
self-determination.23 According to the HPSS programme, the state of South 
Slavs should be united only outwards, while on the inside it should function 
as a community of states. The latter should also include  Bulgaria, and should 
not have the Serbian royal dynasty in the monarch position, similar to how the 
USA was unable to exist under the (British) monarchs. During the first phase 
of the constitutional process, the HPSS was unwilling to recognize the merger 
of the State of SCS and the Kingdom of Serbia as a legitimate act and was 
trying to gain the attention of US President Woodrow Wilson with a petition 
that had gathered 115,167 signatures in Croatia in only six weeks: ‘All of signed 
Croatian citizens declare on the basis of the internationally recognized right of 
national self-determination that we are with our hearts and minds for a neu-
tral Croatian peasant republic, and for the Croats, who form the nation with 
a millennial statehood right, we demand to convene a special Croatian consti-
tutional assembly before the Peace Congress Paris creates a final decision on 
the fate of the Croatian people. We authorize the main board of the Croatian 
Peoples’ Peasant Party and president of the HPSS Stjepan Radić to present this 
request at the Peace Congress in Paris’.24 As a result, the authorities treated the 
party similarly as the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), whose members 
were repeatedly imprisoned. Radić himself ended up in prison, from where 
he managed to send a letter to the French government: ‘All signed Croatian 
citizens decisively protest because the military laws of Serbia were extended 
on the territory of Croatia and because Croatian citizens have been illegally 
recruited in the Serbian army, and we request the Republic of France to protect 
our lives, our families and our property because the Serbian military command 
in Croatia behaves like an occupying force, even worse, and therefore violates 
22 Prepeluh, A., Pripombe k naši prevratni dobi, Založništvo tržaškega tiska, Trst, 1987, 
pp. 171 – 175.
23 Pirjevec, J., Jugoslavija 1918–1992. Nastanek, razvoj ter razpad Karadjordjevićeve in Titove 
Jugoslavije, Založba Lipa, Koper, 1995, p. 14.
24 Banac, op. cit. (fn. 11), pp. 118 and 228.
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international law’.25 The HPSS programme was therefore during the whole of 
that period based on non-recognition of the legitimacy of the First-December 
Act and on the demand to form a special, exclusively Croatian constitutional 
assembly. When it became clear that federalization was out of the question for 
the DS and NRS, the party radicalized its positions and began to pursue the 
ideal of a completely independent Republic of Croatia.
The SLS, the political party with the strongest support among Slovenes, did 
not cooperate with the HPSS during the first period of the Kingdom of SCS. 
Moreover, party chairman Anton Korošec publicly declared his loyalty to the 
Serbian king and opposed the republican state concept: ‘I am a monarchist, 
but also every patriotic republican has to admit that we are not yet ready 
for a republic’.26 Nevertheless, from the outset a significant number of SLS 
members were closer to Radić’s positions regarding internal organization of 
the state. They were gathered around Fran Kulovec, the loudest representative 
of those Slovenians dissatisfied with the events after the War, and especially 
with the break of Aleksandar Karađorđević’s promise given on 1 December 
1918 that the autonomous bodies of the State SCS will continue to operate 
until the Constitutional Assembly is formed.27 This discontent culminated in 
the outcome of the Carinthian plebiscite, when Kulovec stated: ‘As long as 
they in Belgrade do not understand that we are not the United Serbia, but 
Yugoslavia, and that is not the task of our central government to introduce 
the Cyrillic alphabet and fill their pockets with commissions and taxes, and as 
long as they do not realize that they are dealing with free and equal brothers 
and not with the subjugated citizens, we shall experience disappointment after 
disappointment. After Carinthia there will be Gorenjska, and we are blind if 
we cannot agree at least on the requirement of wide autonomy, which should 
guarantee us the position in Yugoslavia we deserve. Only in this way will we be 
important to Belgrade and will we have a meaning in the world, and we must 
not pronounce ourselves as a meaningless province, which can only find its sal-
vation if it renounces Slovenianhood and its specific cultural identity as soon 
as possible’.28 Obviously, during this first period of the new state there was a 
large gap between monarchists and republicans in the SLS. It seems, however, 
25 Ibid., p. 234.
26 Slovenec: političen list za slovenski narod (journal), Vodilne misli za volilni boj v kon-
stituanto. Govor ministra dr. Korošca na sestanku zaupnikov S. L. S. v Mariboru, vol. 48, 
2. Oct. 1920.
27 Perovšek, J., V zaželjeni deželi. Slovenska izkušnja s Kraljevino SHS/Jugoslavijo 1918-1941, 
Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, Ljubljana, 2009, p. 42.
28 Rahten, op. cit. (fn. 4), p. 66.
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that the autonomist fraction prevailed in the end. Even Korošec himself had 
to bow to the republicans, causing the SLS to withdraw from the interim gov-
ernment before the elections and triggering an avalanche of criticism of the 
idea of  centralism in SLS journals: ‘Under the disguise of Yugoslavism, they 
(DS) support the Greater Serbia national idea, national language and religion. 
… they advocate the harshest militarism, they use censorship and restrict free-
dom of association’.29
Beside the HPSS and SLS, some Serb parties were also in favor of decentral-
izing the country. However, the latter had relatively little support and many 
more Serb politicians who opposed the government engaged in the Komunis-
tička partija Jugoslavije (the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, KPJ). The latter 
stemmed from the point of integral Yugoslavism and actually had a similar 
attitude to the national question as the DS.30 In that sense, it was thus a com-
petitor of the DS, which began to take on an important share of public sup-
port in the industrialized cities. The party had the status of a third political 
force in the country with especially strong public support in the capitol city of 
Belgrade, where the government had to break the electoral rules to introduce 
a special regime that prevented the party’s chairman Filip Filipović becoming 
mayor.31 The KPJ programme advocated a soviet model for the state, and for 
this cause one part of the party’s membership was even prepared to violently 
overthrow the government. Consequently, the KPJ was characterized as the 
most dangerous enemy by the authorities. Its relations with the government 
were so strained that in December 1920 the latter issued a special decree lim-
iting the KPJ’s functioning and, the following year, after the assassination of 
Milorad Drašković, the party was finally banned.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS
The constitutional process officially began on 3 January 1919, when the re-
gent Aleksandar convened a temporary assembly for the purpose of forming the 
law for elections to the constitutional assembly. Indicatively, members of this 
assembly were not stipulated by the First-December Act, but were determined 
29 Slovenec: političen list za slovenski narod (journal). Dve mentaliteti, vol. 49, 24. Feb. 
1921.
30 Ribičič, C., Izvršilna oblast v stari Jugoslaviji, Zbornik znanstvenih razprav, vol. 38, no. 
1, 2009, pp. 241 – 268.
31 Tomasevich, J., Četnici u drugom svjetskom ratu 1941–1945, Sveučilišna naklada 
Liber, Zagreb, 1979, p. 24.
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by the government itself.32 Pursuant to that law, Serbia was divided into a larger 
number of smaller electoral units, which then enabled a better result for political 
parties with stronger support in Serbia.33 The relative winner of the elections 
held on 28 November 1920 was the DS with 92 seats, while the second-placed 
NRS won 91 seats out of a total of 419 representatives in the assembly. The 
KPJ (at the time still not prohibited) came third with 58 seats, followed by the 
HPSS with 50 and Savez zemljoradnika (the Association of Farmers) with 39. 
The pro-government Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija (Yugoslav Muslim 
Organization, JMO) won 24 seats, the SLS 14, Socialdemokratska stranka (the 
Social Democratic Party) 10, Hrvatska pučka stranka (the Croatian People’s 
Party) 9, the National Turkish Organization ‘Džemijet’ 8, while seven minor 
parties received less than 8 seats.34
The process continued with adoption of the Rules of Procedure on the Con-
stitutional Procedure, which was, tellingly, drawn up independently by regent 
Aleksandar and the government. According to Article 8 of the Rules of Proce-
dure, each representative had to take an oath to the king and could not become 
a member of the assembly otherwise. This implied unconditional consent for 
the monarchic regime, which significantly limited the assembly’s importance. 
It also enabled the Constitutional Assembly to enforce the constitutional draft 
by a simple majority.35 Accepting the monarchic framework in advance was even 
criticized by those Croatian politicians who otherwise supported the united 
Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian state. An example is Mate Drinković and his speech 
given on 26 May 1921: ‘The elections were carried out, but we did not come 
to the constitutional assembly. That was, my gentlemen, actually a repository 
of people where a few lords ordered that each member must first swear loyalty 
to the king and to be obedient to the rules of procedure, which in advance 
restricted the rights and freedom of national representatives … That was not 
enough for them so they bribed 22 members in order to more easily manage this 
warehouse’.36 Interestingly, the constitutional procedure also required assembly 
members to only discuss the governmental proposal. Only if the latter was not 
32 Sirotković, H.; Margetić, L., Povijest država i prava naroda SFR Jugoslavije, Školska 
knjiga, Zagreb, 1988, p. 233.
33 Ribičič, op. cit. (fn. 30), p. 245.
34 Engelsfeld, N., Povijest hrvatske države i prava – razdoblje od 18. do 20. stoljeća, Pravni 
fakultet, Zagreb, 2002, p. 308.
35 Engelsfeld, N., Poslovnik Ustavotvorne skupštine Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1921. 
godine, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, vol. 44, no. 4, 1994, pp. 377 – 417.
36 Džoić, D., Teorije o složenoj državi (federalizmu) na južnoslavenskim prostorima od početka 
20. stoljeća do 1941. g., Pravni fakultet, Zagreb, 1995, p. 168.
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adopted, could members present their own constitutional initiative with the 
support of at least 20 representatives.37
In the next stage, the government established a constitutional committee 
(it consisted of Slobodan Jovanović, Kosta Kumanudi, Bogumil Vošnjak, Lazar 
Marković and Ladislav Polić) with the aim of drafting the final constitution. 
Indicatively, the starting points for the draft were the previous Serbian consti-
tution from 1903 and the Belgian constitution, both of which implied a unitary 
organization. According to the first draft, the Kingdom of SCS should be divided 
into nine provinces: 1) Serbia; 2) Kosovo, Metohija and Macedonia; 3) Croatia 
and Slavonia with Rijeka, Istria and Međimurje; 4) Bosnia; 5) Montenegro with 
Herzegovina, the Bay of Kotor and the Littoral; 6) Dalmatia; 7) Syrmia with 
Bačka; 8) Banat; and 9) Slovenia with Prekmurje.38 Those provinces would be 
further divided into districts, each district would be divided into ‘kotar’ coun-
ties and the smallest units would be municipalities. The provinces and districts 
were to be state-administrative and self-governing units, the kotar counties 
were expected to be purely state-administrative and the municipalities purely 
self-governing units. Modelled on the Belgian constitution, the state would be 
organized centrally and the provinces should not have classic self-governing 
powers due to the specific jurisdiction of the chief of the province, who could 
prevent the implementation of all provincial assembly decisions. An appeal 
against his veto could only be submitted to the National Council, whose com-
position was determined by the king. Moreover, according to this proposal 
the monarch was supposed to have jurisdiction to appoint the president of the 
first-instance administrative courts in each province.39 
The constitutional process was not smooth (two temporary governments 
resigned and constitutional committee members were changed), but the initial 
draft was never substantially altered. The government of Nikola Pašić (president 
of the NRS) finally presented the draft to the assembly. Pašić himself was the 
first to stand up in defense of the proposal with his speech on 12 May 1921: 
‘Gentlemen, I would like to turn your attention to the fact that constitutions are 
not eternal ... our constitution has to be created to ensure a defense system for 
our country, if our old enemies start to destabilize the current situation. ... As I 
said at the beginning, I consider that this is not a perfect constitution ... If this 
constitution is something that would hinder national progress and development, 
37 Čulinović, F., Jugoslavija između dva rata, Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjet-
nosti, Zagreb, 1961, p. 219.
38 Hohnjec, J., O ustavi naše države, Leonova družba, Ljubljana, 1928, p. 13.
39 Ibid., p. 16.
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and could even hamper the defense of our country, we are here to repair it’.40 
This could be seen as a proposition for the mutability of constitution. However, 
this was not so easy. Any constitutional amendment, according to the proposal, 
could be proposed only by of the king or the national assembly. In the latter 
case, the support of a qualified majority of 60% of all parliamentary members 
was required.41 On the other hand, adopting the constitution only required 
a majority of over 50%. This shows the tendency to maintain the regulation 
mainly proposed by the Serbian representatives, who during the debate in the 
constitutional assembly had emphasized that Serbs had made many sacrifices 
for the new state, and that this was not done for any kind of state form, but 
specifically for a “united” state. The speech by Velizar Janković, the minister of 
railways, on 22 April 1921 is also revealing: ‘And when we have come to discuss 
our national sacrifices, then I must also say this; our people, especially those in 
Serbia, which has given more than a million graves, this nation was not dying 
for federalism, autonomies and similar arrangements, they were not dying for 
the country, which would be similar to the former Austria, they were dying for 
a country that on the inside will be similar to Serbia’.42 Obviously, the govern-
ment officials saw the greatest risk in federalism, which would give autonomy 
to specific parts of the Kingdom of SCS. Which parts they had in mind were 
implicitly indicated by Ljubomir Jovanović in his speech given on 20 April: ‘I 
consider that it is necessary to leave Slovenia in one piece because Slovenia is 
our western part, our border to the west and to central Europe; if we leave it in 
one piece, it will be able to protect us better. This is my personal opinion. ... But 
I also tell you: not all parts of our country are equal. There are places that have 
their own specific needs. This is, for example, Slovenia. However, gentlemen, 
there are areas in which such special needs do not exist, and for which there 
is no reason to have such treatment’.43 If, therefore, Slovenian areas, according 
to some radicals and democrats, could constitute a single unit within the state 
with the argument that a given unit would thereby be stronger, the autonomy 
of the other historical areas represented a threat to the governmental vision for 
the country. These areas had to be split in order to avoid any concentration of 
power outside of Belgrade. Thus, it is not oversimplification if we say that the 
integration of Croatian areas within the Kingdom of SCS was the antithesis of 
the Serbian vision of the South Slav state.
40 Ibid., pp. 20 – 21.
41 Ribičič, op. cit. (fn. 30), p. 250.
42 Hohnjec, op. cit. (fn. 38), p. 21.
43 Ibid., p. 22.
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Slovenian liberals who became members of the DS were also against the 
federalism. Gregor Žerjav, then the most prominent Slovenian liberal politician, 
even tried to put blame for losing Carinthia, Gorizia and Trieste on the federalist 
concept in his speech on 14 February 1921: ‘We (Slovenians) in Yugoslavia have 
experienced two serious losses. Due to disagreements, we have lost Carinthia and 
our brothers in Gorizia and Trieste ... because of them we must abandon any 
separatism ... whenever we read the newspapers from Vienna and Italy, we have 
the feeling that they are very keen to see factions which desire the separatist 
and federalist organization of our country. ... I think ... that such a state would 
be poor, and would only be good for our old enemies’.44 However, although DS 
members were also defending the view that Serbs had scarified the most among 
all South Slavs for the Kingdom of SCS, as explained before, even the Serb 
majority in the DS tried not to emphasize Serbia’s role too much, but instead 
exposed the Yugoslav nation as the party’s main strategic objective. An example 
of that came in a speech by Ljubomir Davidović, chairman of the party, on 15 
April 1921: ‘Even on these occasions, gentlemen, you may hear the call “unite 
Croats”, or another one “unite Serbs” ... I’m against that, gentlemen, I prefer to 
emphasize one other call; with a stronger, better, wider, greater reach, the call 
“Yugoslavs unite!”’45 The Independent Agrarian Party represented by Bogumil 
Vošnjak, who was also a Slovenian member of the constitutional committee held 
a similar position. In his speech on 7 February 1921, he claimed there were not 
enough qualified people for an effective decentralization and that dividing up 
the country on ethnic principles would only encourage separatist tendencies and 
therefore harm unitarism, which according to Vošnjak was ‘the beginning and 
the foundation of the new state’.46 The unitarism concept was also defended by 
the Savez zemljoradnika, which further claimed that for reasons of stability the 
king has to be at the top of the state hierarchy with control over the legislative 
and judicial authorities. Members of the JMO argued similarly, making only 
one additional proposal regarding autonomy: the recognition of Sharia courts 
in Muslim areas.
Parallel to the work of the constitutional committee opposition groups were 
proposing their own visions of the constitution and, as part of them, the orga-
nization of the state territory. Narodni klub (the People’s Club, NK), consisting 
of various Croatian intellectuals, proposed a federalist version that Ivan Pavačić 
thoroughly described on 10 May 1921. The constitution should be based on 
44 Ibid., p. 25.
45 Ibid., p. 22 – 23.
46 Ibid., p. 26.
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five principles, namely: 1) unity of the country; 2) sovereignty of the people; 3) 
individual freedom; 4) social justice; and 5) federalism. The latter was perceived 
as necessary due to Croatian history and its international subjectivity which had 
been preserved for centuries in various kinds of political and legal entities. For 
this group, the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia was a historical fact 
to which Croats had become accustomed and which could not just vanish over-
night. The Kingdom of SCS would thus contain six units: Serbia (which would 
include Kosovo, Metohija and Macedonia); Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia (which 
would include Međimurje, and Istria with the islands); Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Montenegro; Vojvodina (Bačka, Banat and Baranja); and Slovenia. According to 
Pavačić, only such large provinces could also have financial autonomy.47 Under 
this proposal, the parliament should be bicameral, with the national assembly 
being formed by elected representatives at the state level, while representatives 
at the provincial level would form the senate. The latter would have the right 
of veto for any law suggested by the national assembly, except those relating to 
state finances. Each province would have its own assembly and be authorized 
to confirm the king’s proposed appointment of the provincial chief. In line with 
tradition, the leader of Croatia would have the title ‘ban’. The provinces would 
also have provincial courts of law and autonomous legislation, but would not 
have international subjectivity.48
Another alternative vision of the constitution was introduced by the Yugo-
slav Club, which was formed by the SLS, the HPS and the Bunjevačko-šokačka 
Party (a party of Croats from Vojvodina). Anton Korošec presided over this 
group, which opposed the government’s constitutional proposal also due to its 
violation of the Corfu Declaration. This constitutional proposal was some kind 
of attempt to find a compromise between the centralist and federalist visions. 
The state would be a parliamentary monarchy with large government powers 
and at the same time should keep the internal historical borders. The only 
change the Yugoslav Club proposed was to merge Dalmatia with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Other units would be: Slovenia (with Prekmurje); Croatia-Slavo-
nia with Međimurje; Montenegro; Vojvodina; and Serbia. Korošec commented 
on this proposal on 15 April 1921: ‘We know very well why you give so much 
importance to the specific distribution.49 You gave the task to a number to kill 
the historical distribution of country. Most Croats and Slovenians advocate 
much greater power for the authorities of the units which would have, to put it 
47 Ibid., p. 29.
48 Džoić, op. cit. (fn. 36), pp. 175 – 176.
49 The final constitutional draft proposed that each unit within the state should have 
no more than 800,000 inhabitants.
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frankly, historical borders. And this is because we think those historical borders 
will enable us to successfully preserve and improve our cultural, economic and 
political life. ... We require, consistently with our democratic principles and 
objectives, that more people participate in law-making and self-government; 
therefore, we demand the delegation of the legislative and governmental powers 
to the provinces that we propose’.50 According to this proposal, the provinces 
would have provincial assemblies which would have legislative authority on 
the basis of constitutional provisions rather than on the basis of devolution or 
transfer from the central parliament or the king, and would have an exhaustive 
list of responsibilities in the following fields: 1) the interior; 2) trade and crafts; 
3) construction; 4) forestry and mining; 5) agriculture; 6) agricultural reform; 
7) food; 8) education and religion; 9) health; 10) social policy; 11) judiciary; 
and 12) finance. A more detailed explanation of the autonomous provincial 
powers was given by a Croatian member of the Yugoslav Club, Dr Dublić on 31 
March 1921: ‘Nowadays, there is no one who would, theoretically or practically, 
argue that autonomy means sovereignty or that autonomy means a state within 
a state. This is what we do not want. ... Autonomy means nothing more than 
the authorization by a sovereign state for one factor ... If autonomy is good in 
the case of the judiciary and courts of law, why cannot this autonomy be good 
when it comes to ethnic goods and the administration of other areas?’.51 Unlike 
the NS, the Yugoslav Club plan envisaged that the chief of a province would be 
appointed by the government from among three candidates recommended by the 
provincial assembly. Likewise, every provincial law should be further confirmed 
by the government. At the national level, this proposal also recommended a 
bicameral central parliament where each house would have 200 representatives. 
The lower house would be elected at the state level, and the upper house would 
be elected on the provincial level (one-half of those representatives would pro-
portionally represent different social classes (workers, peasants etc.), while the 
other half would be elected on the national level).52 According to this proposal, 
people would have the right to a legislative initiative if the latter was signed by 
at least 10% of all voters. The people could also initiate a referendum on the 
abolition of a law if that was required by at least 20% of all voters. 
The KPJ members, while the party had not yet been banned, were not unit-
ed regarding the participation within constitutional assembly. Some of them 
even boycotted its work, while some communists had sworn to the king and 
50 Hohnjec, op. cit. (fn. 38), p. 45.
51 Ibid., p. 46.
52 Ibid., p. 41.
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attended the parliamentary sessions, but then did not participate in voting on 
the constitutional proposal. The party also did not submit its own plan for 
the constitution.53 Instead, it merely stated that it advocated the Soviet Union 
regime and the universal right to vote for all 18-year-old citizens who work. 
They would, according to the KPJ model, elect representatives to the city so-
viets which would then, under the principle of proportionality, propose their 
delegates in the ‘kotar’ soviets. The latter would choose their delegates in the 
district soviets, and district soviets would send their delegates to the provin-
cial soviets. Finally, the provincial soviets would propose their members to a 
nationwide congress of soviets.
The Socialist Party of Yugoslavia distanced itself from the KPJ programme. 
Etbin Kristan, the party’s chairman, explicitly stated that the Socialists would 
not pursue the revolutionary road to a socialist regime because they agreed 
with the concept of evolutionary state progress. Therefore, they were willing 
to accept the governmental plan for the constitution, which would then be 
gradually changed. Their idealistic vision of the state was a republic with an 
emphasis on decentralization. However, they did not mention the historical 
borders. Kristan described his vision on 14 April 1921: ‘When I’m talking about 
self-government, then I do not demand the autonomy which you are so afraid 
of, and which you think will destroy our country. I, as a socialist, advocate the 
existence of one single state ... because economic life requires a large territory. ... 
but a unified country cannot only be maintained by bayonets, the unity will be 
secured only if people feel happy in this country. You do not want this because 
if you trusted people you would then recognize self-governing rights to the 
people, but you do not want that because you are afraid of the people. ... That 
is why you don’t dare to say how the self-governing bodies will be elected’.54 
As we can see, Socialists were not defending decentralization due to national 
motifs, as confirmed by Milan Korun on 12 May 1921: ‘Regarding the division 
of the country into provinces, we reject all the historical and tribal aspects ... 
I understand the position of the Croats to advocate this kind of division, al-
though I disagree with it and, moreover, I consider it as a bad solution’.55 The 
party largely supported the constitutional plan of Josip Smodlaka, who was 
at that time one of the most prominent Croatian politicians from Dalmatia. 
He envisaged a compromise between the centralist and federalist models, as 
53 Engelsfeld, N., Rad kluba komunističkih poslanika u plenumu Ustavotvorne skupštine (u 
prosincu 1920. i siječnju 1921.), Radovi Instituta za hrvatsku povijest Sveučilišta u 
Zagrebu, no. 2, 1972, p. 255.
54 Hohnjec, op. cit. (fn. 38), p. 32.
55 Ibid.
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had been used in the South African Union. The state should be unified with 
a strong central government and indivisible sovereignty, but at the same time 
would have administrative units with the status of self-governing regions. There 
would be 12 provinces according to Smodlaka’s proposal, and each would have 
a provincial assembly, a provincial government and a chief of the province. The 
elections for provincial governments and assemblies would be held every three 
years, while the chief of the province would be elected by the king from among 
candidates proposed by the provincial government. All provincial powers would 
be defined precisely in the constitution, and would not be subject to change if 
there was no qualified majority in the constitutional assembly.56
The HPSS, which was renamed to Hrvatska republikanska seljačka stranka 
(the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, HRSS), refused to participate in the 
constitutional assembly but had proposed its own constitutional plan which 
was published on 26 June 1921.57 The party demanded full national sovereignty 
and a republican type of country. Sovereignty should, according to this pro-
posal, be achieved with a plebiscite on the convocation and dissolution of the 
constitutional assembly. In order to initiate the plebiscite, the petition should 
collect at least 100,000 signatures of citizens older than 18 (including women). 
Any kind of transformation of the historical borders would not be possible 
without a plebiscite. For a law initiative or an amendment it would be neces-
sary to collect only 30,000 signatures of citizens. National sovereignty would, 
under this proposal, also be practiced through the electoral system for separate 
constitutional and legislative parliaments. The first would be convened 14 days 
after the elections and could only dissolve itself, without the king’s intervention. 
On the other side, the legislative parliament would be elected every four years. 
According to the HRSS programme, the crucial self-governing bodies would be 
municipal and county assemblies. Both the counties and municipalities should 
have full autonomy in adopting their own policies and laws in all areas except 
those explicitly reserved for governmental bodies at the national level. Even 
the president of the republic (who would be elected every four years) or the 
government would not be able to intervene in the autonomous self-governing 
affairs. The areas that would fall under national jurisdiction and be covered by 
the government were the following: ministry of justice, the national economy, 
national education, national health, national defense, international relations, 
and finance in listed fields. The programme also included an article that pro-
56 Džoić, op. cit. (fn. 36), pp. 180 – 181.
57 Sirotković, H., Radićev Ustav neutralne seljačke republike Hrvatske iz 1921. godine (U po-
vodu 80. obljetnice donošenja), Rad Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti, Zagreb, 
knj. 482, 2002., pp. 81 – 93.
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hibited the government from engaging in secret diplomacy and recognizing 
any kind of secret agreements. At the same time, the plan also set strict limits 
for the state in determining income tax. Judges should be independent and 
could not be changed, transferred or retired before the age of 65, when they 
automatically retire.58 
The plans of certain other Croatian political parties were even more subver-
sive. For example, Hrvatska stranka prava (the Croatian Party of Rights, HSP) 
announced its programme on 1 March 1919 in which it declared that, on the 
basis of the entire Croatian history, the party remained committed to realizing 
the historical state of the Croatian people, its right to self-determination and 
the integration of all Croatian territories, namely Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia 
with the islands, Rijeka, Međimurje, Prekmurje, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Istria 
with the islands to form a single Croatian state. The HSP called for a people’s 
democratic republic where the president would head the country and preside 
from the capitol city Zagreb. The HSP programme did not define exactly the 
country’s internal structure, but mentioned provinces with extensive autonomy. 59
We can conclude the constitutional debate was very dynamic. The proposals 
included the whole spectrum of different organizational concepts; from the 
unitary model of the NRS and the DS to a variety of federal and confederal 
models, and even completely separatist ideas that denied any kind of community 
of the Habsburg South Slavs and the Kingdom of Serbia. However, the final 
constitutional draft did not take any of the alternative proposals into account. 
Moreover, the Corfu Declaration was violated once again and the draft was 
accepted only by a simple majority. On 28 June 1921, on the anniversary of the 
Kosovo battle and the Vidovdan, 223 members of the constitutional assembly 
voted in favor, 35 were against and the rest abstained or boycotted the assembly’s 
work (HRSS, KPJ and the Yugoslav Club). As historian Christian Nielsen said 
the day itself sent an unfortunate message that the constitution represented 
the triumph of Serb national ideology.60 The fact that representatives of 72% 
voters from Croatia-Slavonia areas, 75% voters from Dalmatia, 70% voters from 
Slovenian areas, and even representatives of 57% voters from Montenegro boy-
cotted or were against the constitution in its accepted form is in line with the 
thesis on Serbian predominance in the process of constituting the new state.61
58 Džoić, op. cit. (fn. 36), pp. 181 – 185.
59 Ibid., p. 187.
60 Nielsen, C., A., Making Yugoslavs: Identity in King Aleksandar’s Yugoslavia, University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2014, p. 40.
61 Balkovec, B., Volivci in glasovanje o vidovdanski ustavi, Zgodovinski časopis, vol. 43, no. 
2, 1989, pp. 241 – 248.
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4. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VIDOVDAN CONSTITUTION
The accepted version of constitution defined the Kingdom of SCS as a 
constitutional, parliamentary and hereditary monarchy, while the second and 
third articles promoted the assertion of one nation composed of three tribes.62 
Article 46 assigned the legislative power to the king and the national assembly, 
although Article 49 stated that a law cannot be accepted without the consent of 
the king. Article 47 stated that ‘the king practices the constitutional authority 
through the responsible ministries framed by the constitution’.63 The judiciary 
should be within the domain of judges according to Article 48, but the latter 
should act on behalf of the king and on the basis of laws.64
Analysis of the king’s constitutional powers shows that the king had the right 
to convene elections and sessions of parliament. Of course, he was also empow-
ered to dissolve parliament, and there was no other condition except convening 
new elections in the next three months and constituting a new parliamentary 
assembly within four months. Theoretically, the king could repeatedly dissolve 
the parliament as many times as needed until it reaches the composition he 
wanted.65 Moreover, due to the fact of being elected by the king and given his 
subordination to the ministers, we can agree with the opinion of Perovšek66 that 
the chief of a province was a government representative whose operations were 
fully determined by the central government and the king. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the parliament was only nominally placed in the same rank as the 
king, but was in fact below him. Although the government, individual ministers 
and members of parliament also had the legislative initiative, under Article 78 
the king could reject any proposal arbitrarily. He indeed had an absolute veto 
regardless of the field of a particular law, and regardless of the parliamentary sup-
port for the proposal. Interestingly, the responsibility for any legislative initiative 
of the king was on the government because his initiative had to be approved by 
a particular minister.67 However, that did not limit the king’s powers since he 
was empowered, according to Articles 90 and 91, to appoint the prime minister 
62 Sućeska, A., Istorija i prava naroda SFRJ, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1985, p. 182.
63 Danić, D., O uredbama: rasprava iz javnog prava, Štamparija »Dom Maloletnika«, 
Beograd, 1929, p. 32.
64 Engelsfeld, op. cit. (fn. 34), p. 318.
65 Ribičič, op. cit. (fn. 30), p. 251.
66 Perovšek, J., Unitaristični in centralistični značaj vidovdanske ustave, Prispevki za no-
vejšo zgodovino, vol. 33, no. 1-2, 1993, p. 23.
67 Art. 87 Ustava Kraljevine SHS, Uradni list deželne vlade za Slovenijo, Ljubljana, 
1921.
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and other ministers.68 Moreover, ministerial sessions were headed by the king 
himself. Even if a parliament majority sought to impeach one of the ministers, 
the king could arbitrarily decide to recognize the impeachment or not. Due to 
empowerment of the king to intervene in any conflict between the government 
and parliament, some historians and lawyers69 conclude that the Kingdom of 
SCS was primarily a monarchy, while the adjective ‘parliamentary’ should be 
conditionally understood. Indeed, the parliament’s powers were severely limited 
at the expense of the king. The constitution itself came into force only upon 
the king’s recognition.70 Although Article 109 asserted the independence of the 
judiciary, the king also had a strong influence in this field, foremost with the 
power to block the courts. Advocates of the new constitution tried to excuse this 
fact with the difficulties of unifying all courts from different legal backgrounds. 
Therefore, the king was expected to be some kind a homogenization factor in 
the judicial system, which consisted of six legal systems with a different heritage. 
While this was true, it seems this was not the main cause for the king’s control 
over the judiciary. Article 111 stated that judges are appointed by a specific 
organ, but every judge had to be approved by the king. 
In terms of the country’s internal organization, we can agree with the opin-
ion of Neda Engelsfeld71 that the fundamental constitutional principles in the 
observed case were centralism of government and national unitarism. This was 
demonstrated by the articles relating to the official ‘Serbian-Croatian-Slove-
nian’ language and ‘Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian’ nationality. The king and the 
prince had to take an oath before the national assembly that they would guard 
the ‘unity of the nation’, and schools were required to ‘give moral education 
and develop civic consciousness in the spirit of national unity’. Moreover, the 
constitution prohibited all newspapers and media that encouraged separatism 
on a ‘tribal’ basis, while every citizen was obliged to ‘serve the interests of the 
national community’.72 Similarly as Engensfeld, Avdo Sućeska73 considered that 
the state administration was organized by bureaucratic principles and had the 
characteristic of a centralized state with a clear hierarchy, and a king at the top 
of it with the “final word” for all three branches of government. His will was 
implemented through 17 ministries, which were coordinated through the council 
68 Sirotković; Margetić, op. cit. (fn. 32), pp. 243 – 244.
69 See e.g. Sućeska, op. cit. (fn. 23), p. 184.
70 Ribičič, op. cit. (fn. 30), p. 246.
71 Engelsfeld, op. cit. (fn. 34), p. 323.
72 Perovšek, op. cit. (fn. 66), pp. 17 – 26.
73 Sućeska, op. cit. (fn. 23), p. 182.
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of ministers. The state had a unified state territory, a single citizenship and a 
single system of organizing authority across the territory. In order to maintain 
a centralist-unitary regime, the king, the DS and the NRS included Article 95 
of constitution which implicitly prohibited the idea of federalism. The article 
stated that an administrative unit could only be determined by natural, social 
and economic criteria, and at the same time no unit was allowed to have more 
than 800,000 inhabitants.74 However, JMO managed to achieve preservation 
of the historical borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina in article 135.75
The king had the right to choose the chief of province, who exercised provin-
cial administration under the direct supervision of the minister of the interior. 
This enabled the transfer of affairs from the existing provincial governments to 
particular ministries. The constitution stipulated that the powers tied to each 
provincial administration (financial, educational and socio-economic) were 
under the supervision of governmental representatives. Consequently, the fi-
nance minister had complete control over financial flows in self-governing units. 
Full control of the central government was strengthened by the law on county 
self-government adopted in April 1922. The latter divided the country into 33 
provinces which were not determined by historical or national facts. Counties 
and municipalities were supposed to represent local self-governing units, while 
the provinces only exercised selected self-governing powers. Regardless of that 
fact the first elections for provincial assemblies were not held till 1927, due to the 
obstruction of centralist political parties.76 Moreover, even those self-governing 
powers were minimized, allowing the central national authorities to implement 
their decisions at any time.77 This once again confirmed the wide competences 
of the king who could prevent the implementation of any decision of self-gov-
erning bodies through the chief of the province.78 The law on the state admin-
istration ordered the transfer of the then provincial powers to the central state 
administration in such a way that ‘the general administration includes all affairs 
from the ministers of the interior, education, agrarian reform, for agriculture 
and water, for constructions, for trade and industry, for national health, social 
policy, religion and for the forests and ore’.79 The executive of these affairs was 
74 Perovšek, op. cit. (fn. 24), p. 20.
75 Art. 135 Ustava Kraljevine SHS, op. cit. (fn. 67).
76 Stiplovšek, M., Prizadevanja skupščin ljubljanske in mariborske oblasti za izvajanje razširi-
tev samoupravnih pristojnosti (1927 – 1929), Lex localis, vol. 11, no. 1, 2004, pp. 1 – 19.
77 Sirotković; Margetić, op. cit. (fn. 32), p. 247.
78 Art. 101 Ustava Kraljevine SHS, op. cit. (fn. 67).
79 Perovšek, op. cit. (fn. 66), p. 22.
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the chief of province who had to oblige the instructions of the ministers. All 
other affairs came directly under the jurisdiction of individual ministries. As 
already mentioned, the provincial chief had the power to prevent any decision 
of self-governing bodies. It was possible to appeal against his decision to the 
state council, which represented some kind of supreme administrative court. 
5. CONCLUSION
As with any constitutional issue, the separation of law and politics may 
seem to be an unbridgeable problem, but it is fact that constitutional law is 
always in the function of politics. Indeed, all constitutional decision-makers 
indisputably come from the political sphere. Therefore, also in this particular 
case the constitutional alternatives should be perceived in the function of dif-
ferent political strategies whose fundamental lines were formed long before the 
Kingdom of SCS was being established.80 The latter was marked by the violent 
removal of everything that smelled of the Austro-Hungarian regime, while the 
hegemony of the new government sought to consolidate itself by establishing 
predominantly Serb state pillars. In these terms, the constitution was clearly the 
crucial legal act. However, the adopted Vidovdan constitution and the following 
laws did not achieve the fundamental mission of the constitutional document, 
as occurred in other European countries at that time. For example, the essence 
of the French Constitution of 1791 was the definition of human and civil rights 
while, on the other hand, the Belgian constitution of 1831 emphasized that 
the king only had as much power as the people had delegated to him.81 On the 
contrary, the constitutional system of the Kingdom of SCS established a kind 
of paradox of parliamentarism. It is true however that most of the new states 
after the World War 1 had instable governments and were characterized by 
instability of the executive, but in other countries, parliaments were generated 
as a result of reducing the monarch’s power and increasing the influence of 
the people’s representatives. In this case the parliament had no possibilities of 
limiting royal power, but was actually a tool through which the king exercised 
his will. Therefore, we may agree with the opinion82 that in this case we cannot 
speak about a dualistic organization of the state with shared powers between 
the king and parliament, but about the absolutist regime of the Serbian king, 
which was only formally confirmed on 6 January 1929.
80 Banac, op. cit. (fn. 11), p. 149.
81 Hohnjec, op. cit. (fn. 38), p. 5.
82 Ribičič, op. cit. (fn. 30), pp. 241 – 242.
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The Vidovdan constitution confirmed the victory of the Serbian vision for 
the South Slav country; a country that would include all areas from Garašanin’s 
plan; a country in which Belgrade is the political and administrative center; 
a country in which Serbs would have the relative majority; and a country in 
which the smaller nations would be prevented from political emancipation and 
realizing their autonomous national ambitions. The constitution failed to shrink 
the gap between opposite political sides, and at least temporally defeated all 
those political forces that sought to implement either a confederation, feder-
ation or perhaps some kind of union of states, which would be connected by 
the same ruler. Nevertheless, this study shows there were numerous supporters 
of alternative solutions, which advocated a totally different South Slav state, 
chiefly as a community of states. 
From the Slovenian perspective the state that was actually realized repre-
sented one step forward in their national emancipation because, unlike in the 
Habsburg Monarchy, Slovenians had achieved at least partial subjectivity within 
the Kingdom of SCS, as confirmed by including Slovenians in the name of the 
newly created state. However, on the other side, the Vidovdan constitution re-
duced Slovenians to one branch of a larger nation. It is also true that the forma-
tion of the Kingdom of SCS enabled Slovenian fundamental political objectives 
to be achieved, namely to delimit the Slovenian territory in the nationally mixed 
areas in the west and north. However, the demarcation process resulted in a poor 
outcome for the Slovenians, especially those in Gorizia, Trieste and Istria who 
were cut off from the majority of Slovenians. Something similar was the case of 
the Istrian Croats as they too were separated from the Croatian core. This only 
further reduced the Slovenian and Croatian political influence in the Kingdom 
of SCS, and increased the relative influence of the Serb population, which eased 
the governmental efforts to preserve the unitary-centralist regime. From the 
Croatian perspective, the Vidovdan constitution represented the abolition of 
all elements of Croatian statehood, primarily the Croatian parliament, which 
represented a pivotal pillar of Croatia’s sovereignty. The dissatisfaction of the 
Slovenian and Croatian opposition resulted in a latent internal political factor 
of instability, which endangered the very existence of the country especially 
during periods of major geopolitical shifts in the broader international com-
munity. The conflict between the different South Slav visions culminated in 
the assassinations in 1928 and 1934 and, finally, the internal weakness of the 
state was confirmed during World War 2 when the state collapsed practically 
without any resistance.
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Sažetak
Igor Ivašković ∗
VIDOVDANSKI USTAV I ALTERNATIVNE USTAVNE STRATEGIJE
U članku se analiziraju ključne točke sukoba u ustavnom procesu Kraljevine Srba, 
Hrvata i Slovenaca od nastanka te države do usvajanja Vidovdanskog ustava. Autor 
identificira pitanje unutarnjeg teritorijalnog razgraničenja kao nepomirljiv dio inače 
šireg spektra ustavnopravnih sporova između najutjecajnijih političkih stranaka. Pritom 
argumentira tezu da izvor sukoba leži u činjenici da su različite političke strategije vezane 
uz partikularne nacionalne ideologije bile formirane puno prije nastanka jugoslavenske 
ideologije i stvaranja države 1918. Iako nisu bile u potpunosti jedinstvene u pogledu svih 
ustavnih pitanja, najveća slovenska i najveća hrvatska politička stranka zagovarale su 
očuvanje povijesnih granica, što je bilo u skladu sa strategijom federalizacije koja se teme-
ljila na nacionalnom principu. Različitim političkim i pravnim manevrima njihovi su se 
alternativni prijedlozi u potpunosti zanemarili te je usvojen unitaristički Vidovdanski ustav.
Ključne riječi: ustav, državna organizacija, politička strategija, lokalna uprava, na-
cionalno pitanje
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